Supply-side policies to improve access to rental housing in Spain
Pablo Tucat, María Laffaire
9 Jun, 2021
Lower-income people access housing to a greater extent through renting (only 55% of Spanish households at risk of poverty own their home), and housing-related costs account for a larger share of their budgets (26%) than for homeowners (11%). As a result, 33% of the population in the poorest quintile is overburdened by housing costs.
Demand-side policies focused on income can help resolve this situation, but they are unlikely to be enough on their own, as they find it harder to reach families at the lower end of the income distribution (particularly tax deductions). Moreover, their use can push up housing prices, which leads to part of these benefits being transferred to landlords.
On the supply side, the policies considered so far for Spain have serious limitations.
- Deductions and penalties for keeping homes empty have high costs associated with their management and enforcement.
- Price controls can (1) reduce housing supply in the medium and long term; (2) worsen the quality of the housing stock; (3) segment the market between regulated and unregulated areas, with considerable price increases in the latter; (4) trigger anticipatory increases that end up in excessively high prices. By contrast, Spain lags well behind in the supply of social rental housing: between 2014 and 2018, at the height of the rise in rents, only 7 in every 100 new subsidised homes in Spain were for rent, almost all of them in a few regions (Cantabria, Navarre, Catalonia or the Basque Country). And this despite having one of the smallest social housing stocks in Europe: barely 2.5% of the total (3.9% in Germany, 16.5% in France, 21% in Denmark).
To reverse this situation, by expanding the stock of homes available for social rent in a viable and non-segregated way, we propose two innovative policy lines:
- Promoting, in certain cases, rights of first refusal and pre-emption: a preferential purchase right for the Administration in transfers of homes that meet certain conditions, which should be tailored to the characteristics and needs of families seeking social housing, avoiding locations that are unattractive as a main residence.
- Land reservation and density bonuses: a land reservation principle would require a percentage of the units built to be allocated to social housing. This would have the added advantage of avoiding urban segregation. However, to ensure that it produces the desired increase in housing supply, administrations should offer incentives to improve profitability. This could be achieved through density bonuses, which allow developers to build more square metres than the zoning rules for that area permit.
Given how innovative these policies are, their evaluation, always essential, becomes even more relevant in this case. In particular, any land reservation initiative and the corresponding type of incentives should be accompanied by an evaluation that weighs costs and benefits in the context in which they are applied.


Máster en Políticas Públicas por la Universidad de Pennsylvania y candidata a Máster en Econometría por la Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, especializada en análisis y evaluación de políticas públicas. Consultora KSNET.
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