{"id":14874,"date":"2026-11-11T07:45:00","date_gmt":"2026-11-11T06:45:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/webecpol.esade.edu\/?p=14874"},"modified":"2026-11-11T07:48:04","modified_gmt":"2026-11-11T06:48:04","slug":"stability-for-those-who-rent-availability-for-those-looking-a-unified-rental-contract","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/webecpol.esade.edu\/en\/blog\/stability-for-those-who-rent-availability-for-those-looking-a-unified-rental-contract\/","title":{"rendered":"Stability for those who rent, availability for those looking: a unified rental contract"},"content":{"rendered":"<div style=\"padding: 14px 18px; margin-bottom: 24px; background-color: #f2f3f5; border-left: 3px solid #c4c8ce; color: #5a6069; font-size: 14px; line-height: 1.6;\"><em>This post is part of a series of concrete, evidence-based policy proposals put forward by economists from a range of backgrounds, with the aim of being useful to and informing the electoral and post-electoral debate in Spain. They reflect the position of the authors, not that of the centre.<\/em><span style=\"display: block; margin-top: 8px;\"><em>This article has been written in a personal capacity. The opinions it contains are exclusively those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of any institution with which they are affiliated.<\/em><\/span><\/div>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<div style=\"padding: 18px; background-color: #225e9c33; border: 1px solid ##225e9c33; font-size: 16px;\">\n<h3>Key ideas<\/h3>\n<p>\u2192 <strong>The problem:<\/strong> the debate on how to regulate renting in Spain swings between freezing terms and prices, which gives stability to those who already rent, and liberalising, which favours availability for those looking for a home. But the current framework neither truly protects nor resolves the dilemma: it strings together emergency measures that expire and are renewed decree after decree, without giving tenants lasting security or landlords rules they can trust.<\/p>\n<p>\u2192 <strong>The solution:<\/strong> a single, open-ended contract with a free rent. Tenants can leave whenever they want, after six months and with thirty days&#8217; notice. Landlords can leave without compensation on certain grounds, or without cause by paying compensation known in advance, which grows with the length of the tenancy and with the number of homes the landlord owns.<\/div>\n<p>Since 2018, seven decree-laws on renting have been approved and repealed. Few things can depress supply as much as not knowing which rules will govern the contract one signs today. While tenants are protected with mandatory extensions and bans on evictions, landlords consider leaving the residential market in search of alternatives in, for example, other segments or uses. This is the underlying dilemma of all rental regulation: the stability guaranteed to those who already have a contract can end up being paid for with less availability for those still looking for a home, and for the owner who needs to use it.<\/p>\n<p>The debate on what legal framework our rental market needs also remains trapped between two poles: capping prices and freezing terms through measures such as those described above, which buy stability at the expense of availability, or liberalising everything, which does exactly the opposite. Here we would like to propose a third alternative: an open-ended contract by default, with the rent set by the market, which the landlord can exit without giving a reason by paying compensation.<\/p>\n<p>This proposal can be understood as the final piece of a triad, and the three must be read together. The first is to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.esade.edu\/ecpol\/en\/blog\/expand-social-housing-while-we-build-it\/\">expand the social housing stock without waiting to build it<\/a>. The second is <a href=\"https:\/\/www.esade.edu\/ecpol\/en\/blog\/how-to-protect-todays-and-tomorrows-vulnerable-tenants-a-proposal-for-public-rent-insurance-in-spain\/\">public insurance against non-payment of rent<\/a>. And the third, the contract we propose, which makes it possible to remove rent caps and speed up the response to non-payment because it shifts the protection of vulnerable households to the public budget. But that protection is only credible if the other two pieces exist: insurance that makes screening tenants unnecessary and a social housing stock in which to house vulnerable households that cannot afford a market rent. In this way, the stability of vulnerable households is no longer paid for by reducing availability and is instead financed from the budget.<\/p>\n<h3>Why regulate rather than leave the market completely free?<\/h3>\n<p>The market failure lies in the cost of moving. Changing homes means searching, paying a deposit and entry costs and, often, changing neighbourhood, school or care network. If the contract sets neither an exit compensation nor a rule for revising the rent, the landlord can capture that cost when renegotiating: the tenant can accept the increase or leave. And in a market with scarcity, finding another comparable home takes longer and costs more, so the landlord&#8217;s power is greatest precisely where the market is tightest. The evidence suggests that the costs attributed to tenant protection are mainly due to the gap between the sitting tenant&#8217;s rent and the market rent and to slow courts, not to the fact that a contract is open-ended (Diamond, McQuade and Qian, 2019; Casas-Arce and Saiz, 2010).<\/p>\n<h3>The proposal<\/h3>\n<p>We propose a single type of residential rental contract, open-ended, for flats and rooms, which replaces the current terms of five (for landlords who are individuals) or seven (legal entities) years, and the current tacit extension. Tenants can decide to leave whenever they wish, after six months and with thirty days&#8217; notice, as is already the case today. Landlords can leave without cause (or, alternatively, on a broad range of grounds that recognises the owner&#8217;s various needs, but which in any case should be broader than the current one, to balance stability and availability). They may only do so from the second year, with notice of one month per year of contract, with a minimum of three and a maximum of six (in Finland it is three or six months), and compensation that grows with the length of the tenancy, from half a month to one month of rent per year, up to a maximum of three months&#8217; rent for those who own a single home, rising to six for large portfolios. What is paid per year lies between the one month&#8217;s rent paid in California or Oregon and Quebec&#8217;s one month per year, and is similar, for example, to the capped severance pay in another market that faces a trade-off between flexibility\/turnover and stability: the labour market. In order of magnitude, it is similar to severance pay for objective dismissal in Spain (twenty days per year), albeit with a lower cap (there, twelve months&#8217; pay). This compensation could also increase with the number of properties the landlord owns, on a continuous scale rather than with a threshold. The justification can be found, for example, in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.esade.edu\/ecpol\/en\/publications\/ownership-concentration-and-rental-prices-in-spain\/\">a recent policy brief<\/a>, which shows that, although the effect is small and worth confirming with analysis of more recent years, landlords who accumulate more properties raise rents more. With a well-calibrated design of this kind, we could slightly discourage accumulation up to a margin that could have beneficial effects on prices. That said, it would be important to assess and measure whether it might also discourage supply, given that large landlords tend to put a larger share of their property assets into long-term renting.<\/p>\n<p>Small landlords could be allowed to recover their home without compensation, after the first year and with notice, when they can show that they need to live in it (for example, because of divorce or the loss of their main residence) or because of the illness or dependency of a close relative; if they do not occupy it for that purpose within three months or rent it out again within a year, they pay double the compensation. The law already allows this today (Article 9.3 of the LAU, the Urban Leases Act), but only if it was stated in the contract when it was signed and only so that the owner, their first-degree relatives or their spouse after a separation or divorce can move in; the proposal does not require that clause and adds the illness or dependency of a relative. Availability without compensation on justified grounds is perhaps the case that most worries those who own a single flat, and the one that holds back the most supply. The downside of including it is that it reintroduces some of the litigation that the exit compensation is meant to avoid.<\/p>\n<p>Finally, if the home is sold, the buyer is subrogated to the contract, that is, becomes the landlord under the existing lease.<\/p>\n<p>In this context, the initial rent should be free throughout Spain and updated each year with the CPI during the contract, and either party could request a revision to market rent (also downwards) at most every five years, with an official index as a reference.<\/p>\n<p>This index should rely on better-quality and more precise data than the current one. SERPAVI, the current national rental index, measures rental prices with a two-year lag, essentially because it is based on income tax returns. It has been proposed to build it from rental deposit records, but those records have several problems: they are regional and heterogeneous, they capture the characteristics of the home poorly and they leave out rentals for which no deposit is lodged. If an imprecise index decides who has to prove what in court, the error ends up in the courts.<\/p>\n<p>There are three possible solutions:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Cross-match deposit records with data from the Tax Agency (AEAT) and the Cadastre, publish confidence bands and open up the microdata to researchers.<\/li>\n<li>Develop a dedicated statistical operation, in the form of a full survey, on rental prices.<\/li>\n<li>If the previous two are not enough, there is a more ambitious route, but perhaps feasible under a contract of this kind: take advantage of the stability expected from it so that every rental contract goes through a notary, which would solve the problem of timely rental data, albeit with an administrative burden and a cost that would have to be taken into account.<sup>1<\/sup><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>In addition, non-payment should be resolved quickly: the ten-day demand to pay or object already provided for in the Civil Procedure Act and, if that does not work, an eviction carried out within roughly three months. Vulnerability does not suspend the eviction; instead, social services assess it within that period, and the public administration covers the current rent until it can offer alternative housing, with rehousing as the final goal. This is where the triad becomes indispensable. The contract gives stability to the tenant, and non-payment insurance and social housing give security to the landlord.<\/p>\n<p><strong>As for seasonal rentals,<\/strong> they would be kept as temporary stays of up to ten months, not renewable with the same tenant and only for those who can show that they have their main residence elsewhere, along the lines of the French <em>bail mobilit\u00e9<\/em>. The limit seeks to prevent academic years being chained with the same tenant: if the tenant comes to live there or another contract is signed with them, the contract is open-ended. Over time it could be integrated into the single contract: every contract would be open-ended and either party could end it at the end of the first year without compensation. This would remove the incentive to disguise contracts as seasonal ones, at the cost of many landlords being able to rotate tenants systematically every twelve months. That is why it should be evaluated before taking that step.<\/p>\n<h3>Compared with current law<\/h3>\n<p>Compared with the current Urban Leases Act, the proposal is more flexible on three points: the owner can recover the home before five or seven years by paying compensation, the initial rent is free throughout the country and either party can ask for it to be revised to market levels. And it is more protective on three others: the contract no longer has a date after which the landlord can decline to renew it without paying anything, whoever buys the home inherits the contract with no time limit, and seasonal rentals can no longer be used to get around long-term residential leases. A contract with no end date also removes the need to keep adding mandatory, tacit or extraordinary extensions. And public non-payment insurance and the social housing stock remove the need to suspend the evictions of vulnerable households, because their protection comes to be paid for by the public administration.<\/p>\n<h3>Conclusion<\/h3>\n<p>This contract proposal seeks to resolve the dilemma between stability and availability by tackling the problem where it really lies. An open-ended contract with an exit price, market rent and non-payment resolved within months offers both at once: stability for those who already rent without reducing availability for those looking for a home.<\/p>\n<p>England and Finland show that this balance is possible, and also where the difficulty lies. Both seek stability through the contract rather than through prices: England, with the Renters&#8217; Rights Act, made all contracts open-ended in May 2026 and limited rent reviews to once a year; Finland has had open-ended contracts and free rents since the nineties. Where they differ is in how the landlord can exit, which is what determines how much availability is preserved. England has abolished no-fault evictions and requires a statutory ground (such as selling or moving into the home), which strengthens stability but forces litigation over grounds. Finland allows landlords to leave with three or six months&#8217; notice and without compensation, which gives the landlord room but leaves the tenant without a cushion. Our proposal sits between the two: it replaces the ground with a price known in advance, more transparent than a statutory ground and more protective than mere notice.<\/p>\n<p>But this piece does not stand on its own. Finland complements its model with a large social housing stock and generous housing allowances, and the same applies here: only if there is public insurance that makes screening tenants unnecessary and a social housing stock in which to rehouse people can the contract provide stability without reducing availability. As there, the model works as a triad.<\/p>\n<p>Stability, certainty and security for all parties, and a public sector that would make all of this possible by taking on the protection.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p><sup>1<\/sup> Although it need not be an expensive or slow procedure: it could be a fast, digital process, supported by artificial intelligence tools that review the contract and extract its data automatically.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>This post is part of a series of concrete, evidence-based policy proposals put forward by economists from a range of backgrounds, with the aim of being useful to and informing the electoral and post-electoral debate in Spain. They reflect the position of the authors, not that of the centre.This article has been written in a [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":10,"featured_media":14299,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"acf":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v22.9 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Stability for those who rent, availability for those looking: a unified rental contract - Center for Economic Policy - EsadeEcPol<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"http:\/\/webecpol.esade.edu\/en\/stability-for-those-who-rent-availability-for-those-looking-a-unified-rental-contract\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_GB\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Stability for those who rent, availability for those looking: a unified rental contract - Center for Economic Policy - EsadeEcPol\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"This post is part of a series of concrete, evidence-based policy proposals put forward by economists from a range of backgrounds, with the aim of being useful to and informing the electoral and post-electoral debate in Spain. 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